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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FqR REVIEW 
May an employer wrongfully terminate an employment 
contract and then hold the employee responsible for not 
completing performance under the contract? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
There are no authorities which appellant believes to be 
directly dispositive of any of the issues in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action to determine the rights of the parties 
with respect to 11,445 shares of stock in Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters pursuant to the terms of a contract that was 
wwrongfully terminated by respondent. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
The case was tried on March 11, 1987r before The Honorable 
Boyd L. Park, Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah 
County, State of Utah. (R. 290) 
On May 12, 1987, the district court in a memorandum decision 
held that a consulting agreement between plaintiff and defendant 
was wrongfully terminated by defendant. The district court also 
held that despite the wrongful termination by defendant, 
plaintiff must nonetheless return 11,445 shares of Company stock 
to defendant. (R. 300) This stock constituted a material portion 
of the consideration which plaintiff was to receive pursuant to 
the agreement. 
The order incorporating the lower court's decision was 
entered on June 23, 1987. (R. 303-4) Plaintiff filed his Notice 
of Appeal on July 23, 1987. (R. 305-A) 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January, 1981, Plaintiff-Appellant, Richard Smith 
(hereinafter "Smith") entered into an employment contract with 
Defendant-Respondent Rocky Mountain Helicopters (hereinafter 
"Rocky Mountain"). The primary negotiator £or Rocky Mountain was 
its acting President, Jim Burr (hereinafter "Burr"). (Tr. 17) 
The initial contract was in all bractical aspects an 
employment contract whereby Smith was to ac*f as Vice President of 
Finance in exchange for a salary and incentive bonus. 
One of the primary duties of Smith under the employment 
contract was to locate a buyer and negotiat^ a sale of all of the 
stock and/or assets of Rocky Mountain to a third party. (R. 291) 
However, as Smith attempted to perform hi^ obligations, he was 
repeatedly hampered by the actions of Burr and other Rocky 
Mountain officers. First, Rocky Mountain qecretly issued 58,000 
shares of Rocky Mountain stock to Burr anci his brother thereby 
diluting the interest of all other shareholders, including Smith. 
By reason of Smith's objections, the new i$sue of stock to Burr 
was cancelled. (Tr. 43-44) However, the transaction was 
distracting and hampered Smith's efforts to perform his 
obligations. Second, when Smith successfully performed his 
primary duties and obtained a Letter of Intent from a buyer (the 
buyer was called Offshore Logistics Company) commiting to the 
purchase of all of the stock of Rocky Mountain (Tr. P-9), 
Burr suddenly changed his mind and refused to pursue the stock 
sale. (Tr. 46-50) Finally, despite Smithfi attempts to perform 
his obligations, Burr attempted to unilaterally amend the 
employment agreement by limiting Smith's authority and thereby 
impairing his ability to perform. (Ex. P-ll) 
Rocky Mountain's repeated interference with Smith's per-
formance caused a significant dispute to arise between the 
parties. (R. 294) However, the parties succeeded in compromising 
their differences by preparing new agreements which were 
designated as a "consulting agreement" and an "escrow agreement". 
(Tr. 109) The escrow agreement specifically stated that all 
prior agreements were superceded and that the new agreements 
constituted the sole agreements between the parties. (Exs. P-13 
& P-14) It is the consultation agreement and escrow agreement 
that are the subject matter of this litigation. 
Before summarizing the terms of the consulting and escrow 
agreements, it should be noted that pursuant to the prior 
employment agreements, Smith was issued 11,445 shares of Rocky 
Mountain stock as partial consideration for services under the 
prior agreements. (Ex. P-7) 
Under the new Consulting Agreement, Smith was to be employed 
by Rocky Mountain for the period of one year. His principal 
assignment was to sell the company or raise equity funding. 
Smith, in turn, agreed to place his 11,445 shares of Rocky 
Mountain stock, (Cert. #103) in escrow. This agreement was 
memorialized in a writing dated February 15, 1984, which 
consisted of a Consulting Agreement prepared by Smith and Burr 
and an Escrow Agreement prepared by Rocky Mountain's attorney, 
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Jerry Thorn. The actual signing of the Escrow Agreement was 
February 27, 1984. (Ex.s P-13 & P-14) 
Under the Consulting Agreement, Smith's principal assign-
ment involved activities towards the goal ot either selling Rocky 
Mountain or adding additional equity to the company. He would 
also act as an agent of Rocky Mountain in his efforts to raise 
equity capital and function as a financial or corporate planning 
advisor to Burr and Rocky Mountain in whatever areas they might 
see fit. 
The consulting agreement provided theit for his consulting 
services, Smith would receive consideration in the amount of 
$275.00 per day or $137.50 per half day for the time that Smith 
spent rendering consulting services for th^ Company. Smith was 
also to receive the benefit of having his medical and dental 
insurance paid for by the Company and continued life insurance 
and associated health insurance. 
Under the consulting agreement, Smith received his income 
taxes prepared for the 1983 tax year, $1,000.00 worth of spousal 
travel upon approval, use of the Xerox machines and use of the 
Watts lines for personal use only. Smith wa^ given an Oldsmobile 
automobile and four new tires for the car in I exchange for accrued 
vacation, sick time and separation benefits. Smith was to receive 
50 gallons of gasoline per month and an agreement was provided 
for the exchange of Smith's receivables from the Windgate Oil for 
a Suburban automobile. (Ex. P-13) 
The Escrow Agreement, which is dated February 17, 1984, pro-
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vided that the was to be understood by Rocky Mountain and Smith, 
that this Escrow Agreement superceded all prior agreements and 
was the sole agreement between the parties governing the 
disposition of stock. (Ex. P-14) 
The Agreement also provided as follows: 
If, at any time during the one-year from the 
date of this agreement, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTERS, INC., is sold to a third party, 
or parties, either by virtue of a majority of 
its assets being purchased, or, in the 
alternative, any public or private sale of 
its stock or the stock of any subsidiary 
takes place, then in that event, the shares 
of stock represented by the certificates 
deposited herewith will be returned to 
Richard S. Smith; provided that if any 
negotiation for the sale of assets or stock 
have begun prior to the expiration of one 
year from the date hereof, that result in 
such a sale, then and in that event, such 
sale will be considered to have occurred 
within the one year previously mentioned 
herein. 
Provided further that in the event the con-
ditions described herein do not occur within 
one year from the date of this agreement, 
then stock represented by Certificate # 
will be returned to ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
HELICOPTER, INC. 
During the latter portion of 1983, there was a crash of one 
of Rocky Mountain's insured helicopters. Pursuant to an exist-
ing agreement between the shareholders, the insurance proceeds 
were required to be distributed to some of the shareholders in 
accordance with their proportionate shares. This disbursement 
was accomplished in early 1984. (Tr. 152) Later, the company 
requested that the shareholders return their proportionate share 
of the insurance proceeds. Burr became upset with Smith when 
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Smith refused to return the money. (Tr. 14|9) 
As a result of this argument concerning the ownership of the 
insurance proceeds from the helicopter ctfash, Rocky Mountain 
sued Smith on April 16, 1984. Three days later, on or about 
April 19, 1984, the suit was settled. Baped on this law suit, 
and other factors, the relationship between Rocky Mountain and 
Smith was strained. (R. 298) 
On March 4, 1984, Smith officially resigned as a Director of 
Rocky Mountain Helicopters. In his formal letter, Smith stated: 
"this no way affects my availability and willingness to continue 
to serve under the Consulting Agreement in areas that are deemed 
appropriate, and particularly with respect v° efforts to sell the 
Company or equity therein". (Ex. D-27) 
On April 23, 1984, Smith's Consulting Agreement with Rocky 
Mountain Helicopters was terminated by Burr as president of Rocky 
Mountain. (Ex. P-20) The lower court specifically found that 
this termination by Rocky Mountain was wrongful (R. 299-300) 
This case was submitted to the Honorable Judge Boyd L. Park. 
The lower court held that there was a valiii employment contract 
between plaintiff and defendant. (R. 29<J) The lower court 
further held that Rocky Mountain had breached the contract by 
wrongfully terminating Smith, and, as such, ISmith was entitled to 
Judgment against the defendant Rocky Mountain as follows: 
a) $600.00 for gasoline benefit 
b. $2,699.55 for medical and insurance expenses the 
plaintiff incurred during the term! of the Con-
sulting Agreement. 
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Notwithstanding this holding, the Court held that Rocky 
Mountain was entitled to the return of the 11,445 shares of 
Company stock inasmuch as the Consulting Agreement and Escrow 
Agreement provided for the return of stock in the event the 
Company was not sold or a public or private sale of equity was 
not effected. (R. 299-300) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This appeal requests this Court to examine the internal 
consistency of the lower court's decision in this case. The 
lower court held that the consulting contract was wrongfully 
terminated by Rocky Mountain and, at the same time, held that 
Smith was responsible for not completing performance under the 
contract and thereby obligated to return to Rocky Mountain the 
11,445 shares of stock held pursuant to the escrow agreement. 
This decision should be overruled and the shares of stock 
returned to Smith. 
The party prevented from performing may be treated as though 
he had performed. In the present case, Smith was prevented from 
performing his contractual obligations by reason of Rocky 
Mountain's wrongful termination. Therefore, Rocky Mountain 
should not benefit from its breach of the employment contract and 
the 11,445 shares of stock should be returned to Smith. 
A. All parties to a contract are obliged to proceed 
in good faith and cooperate in the performance of the 
contract. One party to a contract cannot, by willful act 
or omission, make it difficult or impossible for the other 
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party to perform. 
B. When an employer and an employee have entered into 
an employment contract for a definite period of time, the 
employer may terminate or discharge ar^  employee only upon a 
showing of good cause for said termination. The lower court 
specifically determined that Rocky Mountain's termination of 
the consulting agreement was wrongful. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHERE A PARTY CAUSES A BREACH OR NON+PERFORMANCE OF 
A CONTRACT, HE CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOfc NON-PERFORMANCE. 
THE PARTY PREVENTED FROM PERFORMING MAY BE TREATED AS THOUGH 
HE HAD PERFORMED 
There can be no breach of a contract on the part of one 
whose performance is prevented or rendered impossible by the 
conduct of the other party. The party wjio is prevented from 
performing may be treated or considered as though he had 
perfomed. 17A C.J.S. Sec. 468; See Gibbs v.| Whelan, 239 P.2d 727 
(N.M. 1952) Weaver v. Williams, 317 P.id 1108 (Ore. 1957); 
Bewick v. Mechan, 156 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1945); [Pacific Venture Corp. 
v. Huey, 104 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1940); Overton vj. Vita-Food Corp. 210 
P.2d 757 (Cal. 1949) 
In Gibbs, the New Mexico Supreme Cburt found that the 
parties entered into an agreement wherein defendant hired 
plaintiff to perform certain work. Defendanjt subsequently failed 
to line up the work for plaintiff and ther^ were intervals when 
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the plaintiff could not perform any work, but was still ready, 
able and willing to perform. The New Mexico Court held that the 
defendant having voluntarily failed to line up work for plaintiff 
thus preventing him from fulfilling his agreement, would not be 
permitted to deny liability. 
Smith's situation is very similar to that of the plaintiff 
in Gibbs. During late 1983, and after the consulting agreement 
was signed, Smith was ready, willing and able to work for Rocky 
Mountain. Smith testified that he contacted Rocky Mountain and 
made himself 30*teilable for the consulting work, and kept Rocky 
Mointain informed of his activities. However, Rocky Mountain 
prevented him from meeting with investors from New York, who were 
working on the equity sale of the company. The testimony estab-
lishing these facts is quoted in the Addendum attached to this 
brief. 
Rocky Mountain prevented Smith from carrying out his duties 
under the consulting agreement, even during the time prior to his 
wrongful termination. Because of this prevention, Smith should 
be treated as if he performed his part of the agreement and the 
escrowed stock should be returned to Smith. 
Any conditions which the facts show might have been 
performed by him, it will be assumed would have been performed if 
the conduct of the promisor was such as to preclude the possibi-
lity of performance. 5 Williston on Contracts Sec. 677A at 233. 
The facts in this case show that Smith had accomplished 
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virtually all assignments that he was giv^n by Rocky Mountain. 
(R. 291) At the time immediately prior to his termination, Smith 
continued his negotiations with Offshore T-ogistics, with regard 
to the sale of Rocky Mountain (Tr. 217). Thus, it should be 
assumed that Smith's duties under the contract would have been 
performed, if Smith had not been wrongfully terminated by Rocky 
Mountain. 
Rocky Mountain should not, as a matter of law, be able to 
invoke Smith's nonperformance as a defense to Rocky Mountain 
returning the stock. See Fisher v. John^un, 525 P.2d 45 Utah 
1974); Cummings v. Neilson, 42 Utah 157, 12p P.619 (1912). 
A. All parties who enter into a contract [have an obligation to 
cooperate and perform in good faith. 
The lower court held that Smith and Rocky Mountain had 
entered into a valid contract. (R. 306) On<te a contract has been 
created, the duty of good faith will be implied. 
Section 205, Restatement (2d), Contracts (1981) provides as 
follows: 
Every contract imposes upon each partV a duty of good 
faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement. 
Comment (a) sates in part: 
"Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract 
emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the 
other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct 
characterized as involving "bad faith" because they 
violate community standards of decency, fairness or 
reasonableness." 
This duty to proceed in good faith anc^  to cooperate in the 
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performance of the contract has been accepted by this Court. See 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982); Weber Meadow-View 
Corp. v. Wilde, 575 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1978). 
In the instant case, Smith fulfilled his duty to perform in 
good faith and cooperate. Smith was quite successful in his 
employment in the principal areas which he had been assigned. 
(R.291) In addition to restructuring Rocky Mountain's financial 
position, restructuring Rocky Mountain's arrangement with their 
preferred shareholders, and refinancing the Teacher's Insurance 
Fund, Smith began doing consultation work with the Bill Finley 
group on the behalf of Rocky Mountain. (Tr. 180) Burr, the 
president of Rocky Mountain, told Smith that perhaps a consulting 
agreement with the Bill Finley group would be a good idea. (Tr. 
180-81) Smith continued this consultation work with Finley 
throughout 1983-4. 
Throughout the Fall and Winter of 1983, Smith continued to 
cooperate and perform his duties under the contract in good 
faith. In October of 1983, a letter of intent for the sale of 
Rocky Mountain to Offshore Logistics was negotiated, and ratified 
by the Board of Directors at a meeting on November 15, 1983. (R. 
295) 
However, towards the latter part of 1983, as a result of 
differences regarding corporate policy, a rift arose between Burr 
and Smith. (R. 295) At this point in time, Burr and Rocky 
Mountain began to breach their duty of good faith and 
cooperation. On April 23, 1984, Rocky Mountain made the final 
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breach by wrongfully terminating Smith's consulting agree-ment. 
(R. 300) 
B. Wrongful termination by an employer constitutes a breach of 
the employment contract and excuses, further performance by the 
employee. 
The lower court found from the factjs of this case, that 
there were several instances that conflicts arose between Smith 
and Burr. The problems began toward the latter part of 1983, 
when as a result of differences regarding corporate policy, a 
rift arose between Burr and Smith. (R. 2|94) At this time, a 
Rocky Mountain helicopter crashed. As a result of this accident, 
insurance proceeds were disbursed to Smith ^nd others employed by 
Rocky Mountain. These disbursements took place in early 1984. 
(Tr. 152) Smith refused to return his pdrtion of the proceeds 
and Rocky Mountain filed a law suit against Smith on April 16, 
1984. The law suit was settled on or ^bout April 19, 1984. 
Because of this suit and other factors, th£ relationship between 
Burr and Smith was left strained. (R. 298). In fact, Burr was 
quite angry with the settlement of the law suit. (Tr. 68) Three 
days after the settlement of the suit, Buri^ , acting as President 
of Rocky Mountain, terminated Smith. At thfe time of termination, 
only two months of the twelve month perioq allowed for Smith to 
find a buyer for the company had expired. 
The lower court held that said termination was wrongful. 
(R. 299) And at the same time, the loWer court found that, 
despite termination of the contract, Smit}h was not completely 
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frustrated and prevented from finding a buyer for the Company 
within the one year time period stated in the contract. These 
two findings are in direct conflict with each other. If an 
employer discharges an employee, the employer must meet the 
burden of justifying such discharge. See Chiodo v. General 
Waterworks Corporation, 17 Utah 2d 425, 413 P.2d 891 (1966) In 
the present case, the Court found that that burden was not met 
and that Smith had been wrongfully discharged (R. 299). The 
lower court then held that Smith had been wrongfully discharged 
only in relation to certain items. This decision was erroneous 
as a matter of law. Once a party has been wrongfully discharged, 
there is a breach of the employment contract and the good faith 
standard. See Mitford v. de La sala, 666 P.2d 1000 (Alaska 
1983). This good faith standard was breached by Rocky Mountain 
and they should not be entitled to benefit from the breach. The 
lower court by allowing Rocky Mountain the return of the stock 
allowed the breaching party to benefit. As a matter of law, this 
decision should be overruled. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, plaintiff requests that this case be 
reversed and judgement be entered entitling the return of the 
11,445 shares of Rocky Mountain Helicopter stock to the 
plaintiff. 
14 
DATED this 15th of November, 1987. 
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ADDENDUM 
Q. You have also heard some testimony with regard to 
availability, did you ever try and coptact Rocky Mountain 
Helicopters to make yourself available? 
A. Yes, I offered to as I think I testified before. I 
offered to meet with the consultants who were coming in 
from New York. I was just not allowed to. 
Q. Do you remember were there any [messages left at 
your home that Mr. Burr was trying to get a hold of 
you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you recall - -
A. And those messages had to do wi"th the helicopter 
situation. There was never a single message either at 
my home where my wife stays a hundred per cent of the 
time or at the office in California where I was doing 
the consulting work where there was someone there at 
the phone all of the time. There was never a single 
contact to me to ask for assistance ir> the consulting. 
Q. How many contacts were there with regard to this 
helicopter problem? 
A. Half a dozen. 
Q. And this would all be during the [first, two, three 
four weeks of the consulting Agreement? 
A. Yes it was, yes four or five week?. 
Q. Finally would you explain what ydu 
the Asher Finley Company what your ass 
when you went there and at who's request 
A. Bill Finley had been the general 
blade development program and also ijn 
program which I helped Jim put together, 
and he was invited to sit on our board, 
ly invited me to sit on their boardi. 
capable man. Had been a senior partner 
& Company but was an alcoholic. And 
help from time to time when he was out 
were doing with 
ignment was and 
, etc. 
partner on our 
an oil and gas 
Windgate Oil 
He subsequent-
He was a very 
in Arthur Young 
they needed some 
of commission. 
Q. Can I see the last exhibit that I|have? Thank you. 
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I will show you has been marked as Exhibit No. 28 would 
you identify that and tell me what it is? 
A. Yes this is the November letter to Jim Burr that I 
wrote to just kind of updating him on my status with 
Bill Finley and indicating that there were some 
problems that I would be spending some time on. 
Q. Did you also make verbal reports to him as to what 
you were doing with that company? 
A. From time to time particularly as they had impact 
on the Windgate Oil matter and the helicopter blade 
program. 
Q. Now the last paragraph of this said that I would 
suggest that we proceed to determine exactly what kind 
of time requirements this commitment would impose on me 
but appears that such time requirements might become a 
problem, I would like to discuss that with you at that 
time, did he ever respond to that request? 
A. Not really. 
Q. But he was kept informed of your activities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And this was in November of 1983 four months before 
the Consulting Agreement? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. That is all? 
A. Just going to say during that time I Mr. Finley was 
up and about and capable I went down for a few board 
meetings but was not a large amount of time. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. YOUNG: Just one questions. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. YOUNG 
Q. You indicated that you were not allowed to meet 
with the consultants from New York and you tell me what 
it was that prevented you from doing that? 
A. Jim Burr had as part of the Consulting Agreement 
indicated that he was bringing in some New York people 
to work on an equity sale of the company either a stock 
issue or something I am not sure what they had in mind 
as an initial assignment in my Consulting Agreement he 
17 
had wanted me to meet with them. ^hey were meeting 
with Lew Tippetts and I asked Lew Titopetts on several 
occasions should I become involved [ can I meet with 
them and was essentially told, well let's wait now is 
not the right time and there never was a right time. I 
was not allowed to even be introduced to those people. 
One time when I was there and it would have been very 
practical for them to get to meet me. 
Q. And that what prevented you from ijieeting with them? 
A. Well I could have gone in to the office and said 
that here I am and I am so and so bu|t I did honor the 
office protocol of honoring Lewis' dffice and he and 
Jim meeting with these people. (Tr. 2+9-222) 
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